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SPACE STATION CREW SAFETY [
HUMAN FACTORS INTERACTION MODEL [
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As NASA prepares plans to devlop a s_ace station, one of the major Human Fac-
tors study tasks is to develop an approach to Crew Safety. NASA has always
,been a paradigm of safety consciousness and recognizes that safety willbe a
key to reliabilityand human productivityon the space station. :,_.
In evaluating safety strategies,itisalso necessary to recognize both qualita- _'
Livelyand quantitativelyhow _hisspace stationwillbe differentfrom allother
spacecraft. During the initiulphase of this study, itwas recognized that the
major difference between space station and previous spacecraft is the role of _,
human factors and extra-vehicular activity(EVA), In this project, a model of
the various human factorsissuesand interactionsthat might affectcrew safety
is developed. ._ :
The firststep addressed systematicallythe centralquestion: How isthisspace _ "_'"
stationdifferentfrcm allother spacecraft? A wide range of possibleissues was _ _ "_,
identified and researched. Five major topics of human factors issues that _
interacted with crew safely resulted: Protocols, C_t_cal HRb_tability, Work
Related Issues, Orem lacapacitat_ a_d Perswnal Choice. :_
Second. an interaction model was developed that would show some degree of ,_'_':_i_
cause and effectbetween objectiveenvironmental or operational conditions and
the creation of potentialsafetyhazards. The intermediary steps between these '_':_'"
two extremes of causality were the effectson human performance and the
' resultsof degraded performance. The model contains three milestones: sires-
" sot. human performance (degraded) and safety hazard threshold. Between
"_ these milestones are two countermeasure intervention points. The first oppor-
tunity for intervention is the countermeasure against stress. If this counter-
: measure fails, performance degrades. The second opportunity for intervention
is the countermeasure against error. If this second countermeasure fails, the
threshold of a potential safety hazard may be crossed.
An example of how this interactionmodel works can be demonstrated. Under
L'_licalHabitability,the primary environmental stressorsinclude confinement,
"i isolation and seperation from earth. There are two subgroups of within the first
,_ countermeasure against these stressors,socialand architecturalinterventions.
The social factors are communication with family and friends, visitors to the
station and recreation. The architectural factors are design, station geometry
and "localvertical"reference orientationsand windows. When these socialand :
architectural design level countermeasures against stress are n_t effective, '
crew performance may degrade in the form of morale deterioration, impaired
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"il judgement or faulty perceptions. The second set of countermeasures, against
errors are operational or group social activities plus personal existential
actions. These social subset countermeasures include group activities, hobbies
and time for" personal interests. The design/physical countermeasure sub-
group includes color coding on interior function , lighti g and video system .
ii1 To the extent that this second defense of countermeasures is not successful,
the threshold of potential safety hazards may be crossed. In this instance,
._ p tential safety hazards inclu e _ breakdown in group process and teamwork,
ii and mistakes occuring in judgement, perception or action.
The third step, which is now in progress, is to apply a system of weighting to the
various stressors and countermeasures in order to be able to evaluate their
relative importance. This weighting will also require an element of time dura-
tion to identify which stressors or countermeasures are relevant at the begin-
ning, middle or end of missions, and which are short-lived or chronic in nature. "i
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